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Abstract 
This paper investigates the necessary‐impossible paradox facing hydropower 
decision‐makers of the Mekong River Commission: that aspiring towards a holistic risk 
assessment is both socially useful and necessary, but also meaningless and 
impossible (because the future remains unknown). The thesis here is that to come to 
terms with this paradox, a Luhmannian inspired relational model offers superior 
analytical tools compared with an Aristotelian essentialist approach. This is because 
where the latter typically employs integrative approaches which attempt to show why 
through rational reasoning risk assessments are holistic, the former takes into account 
that holistic risk assessments are contingent on the observer, on an organisation's 
position within a network, and on the ‘temporal atoms’ that mark the ‘time’ of social 
systems. By employing a relational framework comprised of variation, selection and 
retention to capture this comparative sociology of the observer, the contribution here 
offers a radical reformulation of holism in hydropower decision‐making. 
1 On the tradition of holism 
Holism puts the study of wholes before that of the parts. It derives from the Aristotelian 
mindset which sets out to bring together disparate elements into a more integrated 
whole. The reasoning here is just like parts of a body only make sense in terms of the 
way they function to support a whole organism, so too should reductionist approaches 
favour the higher holistic goals of commonly shared values, rational argumentation, or 
coordinated action (Habermas, 1984). Today, this Aristotelian mindset prevails in dam‐
development ‘Downstream Response to Imposed Flow Transition’ – an impact risk 
assessment employed in semi‐arid regions, where water‐supply problems are 
pressing and uncertainties about river‐linked side‐effects high (McManamay & 
Bevelhimer, 2013). Accordingly, the mindset here is that to holistically assess the 
quantity, timing, and quality of water flows required to sustain riverine ecosystems, 
and the human livelihoods that depend on them, two key elements are essential: i) 
that the whole river ecosystem, including all major abiotic and biotic components be 
accounted for; ii) that a structured approach which combines data and knowledge from 
all disciplines be employed to produce flow‐related scenarios for water managers to 
consider.  
At a first glance, this Aristotelian Downstream Response to Imposed Flow 
Transition (DRIFT) approach might seem like an innovative way forward, as promoted 
by the river basin organisation, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) which 
coordinates with the governments of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam to 
provide holistic hydropower scenario‐planning on the Mekong River (Dore, Lebel, & 
Molle, 2012). Typically, these scenarios are justified by ‘predict‐and‐choose 
paradigms’ (Islam & Susskind, 2012); for example, that because the release of large 
 
* Humanities and Law Department, Faculty of Media and Communication, Bournemouth University. 
Email: kkang@bournemouth.ac.uk 
amounts of water from hydropower dam X is predicted to scour/not scour the river 
bed's sediment, we recommend policy agenda A. Of course, there is no denial that 
such DRIFT results and subsequent policy recommendations are necessary for 
informing decision‐making. Yet at the same time, this emphasis that justification can 
ultimately be sought only in the predicted results of DRIFT, also leads back to a 
paradox that the impossible is postulated as necessary. Why? It is because the 
impossibility problem of full prediction will always re‐enter decision‐makers in the 
questions of: Who can say with certainty whether the ‘consequences’ that are not 
directly produced by DRIFT results will actually follow? Who can rule out the possibility 
that unforeseen consequences may in fact change the results of DRIFT? And who can 
guarantee that the DRIFT results themselves are legitimate DRIFT results?  
This brings us to the research problem of the paper: if it is true that aspiring 
towards a holistic DRIFT is both necessary but also impossible (because the future 
remains uncertain), how then might hydropower decision‐makers fully embrace and 
openly exhibit this paradox? Under these circumstances, perhaps what we need is 
neither blind faith in the necessity of ‘full prediction’, nor a more trenchant critque of 
the impossible advocating for ‘no prediction’, nor content with a ‘somewhere between’ 
approach (Allen, 2000) ‐ that would be merely an easy way out of the 
necessary/impossible paradox. Rather, what we need most is a new guideline or 
framework which takes into account that a holistic DRIFT is contingent on the observer, 
on an organisation's position within a network, and to the ‘temporal atoms’ that mark 
the ‘time’ horizons of social systems (Rabinow, 2008). Drawing upon the works of 
Niklas Luhmann, this, I propose, is best theoretically captured by employing a 
relational framework comprised of Variation, Selection and Retention: namely, how 
variations set in when selection and retention take place. In the context of the MRC's 
DRIFT scenario planning which this paper will employ to illustrate the nuances of 
hydropower decision‐making, this can be summarised as follows: that variable DRIFT 
results set in, when the selection is made by the MRC to implement hydropower 
scenario planning and retain legitimacy in decision‐making.  
In what follows, I will first provide a brief summary of how a relational 
methodology, or ‘comparative sociology of the observer’ (Fuchs, 2009), can help flesh 
out some of the problematic implications of the Aristotelian inspired DRIFT approach 
(section 2). I will then explain how a relational methodology radically reformulates the 
notion of holism (section 3), followed by the main body which aims to improve the 
conceptualisation of holism, wherein I employ the MRC's DRIFT as the contextual 
background to illustrate the intricacies of hydropower decision‐making (section 4). 
Finally, reflections on the problem of holism are reached in the last section.  
 
2 Fleshing out the problematic implications of holism 
To this present day, a threefold concept of ‘integrated management’ remains highly 
influential in the Aristotelian inspired DRIFT approach: that integration equates a 
unified whole equalling the total sum of its parts, and that by making use of human 
rationality the assessment of DRIFT can be steered in the direction towards holism. 
This section shares none of these suppositions and will instead flesh out some of the 
problematic implications of this Aristotelian mindset. 
At a first glance, a relational methodology appears to share many 
commonalities with post‐modernist critque: that modern society simply imbues too little 
visible harmony for such Aristotelian dictum of a whole composed of parts. This is not 
difficult to see given that the ‘water‐food‐energy’ nexus intermesh with each other in 
so many different ways that there is simply no collective adding up of perspectives, 
but rather a differentiation into singular horizons, as reflected in several recent 
critiques of integrated water management (Lejano, Ingram, & Ingram, 2013; 
Saravanan, McDonald, & Mollinga, 2009). However, where relational methodology 
and post‐modernist critique diverge is where the approach denies the concept of a 
general (human) rationality. This is because from a relational perspective, the rationale 
that it is enough to use one's own reason in order to find the true state of reality, is 
wholly inadequate to the complexity of modern society. Instead, accordingly here, 
rationality is best conceptualised as the construction of a social (communication) 
system (Moeller, 2012).  
Of course, this conceptual stance is not to deny that people cannot think and 
implement actions themselves, but what is suggested is that people are no longer 
entirely in charge. A scientist eager to provide a ‘holistic’ DRIFT may employ 
multivariate models to predict fish richness or riparian vegetation responses to 
changes in river flows (McManamay & Bevelhimer, 2013). But in order for DRIFT 
results to be of significance and meaningful relevance, policy‐makers must also 
employ a parallel assessment of the social side‐effects which may occur under various 
differentiated flow regimes. Hence, the rationale of the policy‐maker is dependent not 
only on scientific findings, but moreover, on the self‐enhancing, self‐maintenance of 
other social (communication) systems, such as the economy, politics, mass‐media and 
so forth. In short, the point here is not to merely reiterate an Aristotelian plea for 
‘interdisciplinarity’, but rather it is to suggest a far more disturbing observation: that it 
is primarily social communication systems, not people, which actually stimulate and 
perpetuate the processes of societal rationalization.  
If one accepts this sociological insight, then this has dramatic consequences 
for narratives which assume that integrative approaches can steer DRIFT results in 
the direction towards holism. For the issue here is that in a hyper complex society 
where different social systems employ different ‘unrankable’ (Roth, 2017) versions of 
rationality (scientific justice, economic justice, juridical justice), this disturbingly means 
there can be no natural equilibrium and no unilateral control of any one system over 
another. This does not imply each social system does not wish to be heard by other 
systems. But what is implied is that each social system can only ever talk to itself about 
other systems, as exemplified when the systemic rule of rationality determines that all 
scientific observations of DRIFT takes place first on scientific terms, and re‐
contextualised from an economic or legal point of view only second. This is not 
necessarily a bad thing of course, but what is suggested is that social systems have 
an innate tendency to talk past each other, just like ships passing each other in the 
dead of night, which raises the question to be explored next: how can analysis 
rediscover and reconceptualise holism, and how to do this without bemoaning the loss 
of holism?  
 
3 Reformulating the notion of holism 
Relationalism offers a counter‐intuitive methodology for reformulating holism. This is 
because from the perspective of relationalism, the traditional notion of integration, the 
bringing together of disparate elements into a more holistic whole serves only to 
emphasize the ‘realness’ of social aspirations (Luhmann, 2018), rather than as 
concrete blueprints for action. Hence, this explains why DRIFT results which describe 
themselves as ‘holistic’ are frequently impaired whenever the criticisms of capitalist 
hijacking (Molle, 2008), or scientific complexity (Salzman & Thompson, 2007) are 
directed at them. Of course, this is not to say that aspiring towards a holistic DRIFT is 
a meaningless endeavour. But what is suggested is that before jumping ahead to the 
question of ‘What DRIFT results are accurate?’, a vital preliminary question first needs 
to be grappled with, ‘How can one observe and describe adequately the decision‐
making processes of DRIFT’? The relational answer: by denuding the social from facile 
impressions of progress, which in the context of DRIFT discourses, is best acquired 
by conceptualising integration not as a process better or more holistic than 
disintegration, but as the interrelations between social systems (Borch, 2011). Indeed, 
this we may call a relational non‐essentialist reformulation of integrated holism.  
It is important to realise that ‘interrelations’ refers here not to an easy‐to‐grasp 
reality of inter‐systemic connections. On the contrary, it refers to a paradoxical re‐
assertion of the cognitive separation of systems. This is best conceptually captured in 
the schema of system‐environment differentiation, which from a relational perspective 
offers a more accurate understanding of homogeneity compared to the traditional 
Aristolean parts‐whole model. To briefly summarise, this schema postulates that a 
system (such as an organisation) is necessarily less complex than its social 
environment, because, to operate efficiently, a system can only select a limited amount 
of all the information that is available outside its boundaries (Luhmann, 1995). In other 
words, it is only through the reduction of a systems environmental complexity can the 
conditions for systemic interrelations be built (Valentinov, 2014), as Luhmann 
scientifically sums up, ‘reduction is a necessary condition for the ability to resonate; 
reduction of complexity is a necessary condition for building complexity’ (Luhmann, 
2004).  
The difference between Aristotelian philosophy and system‐environment 
differentiation can be summarised in the table below:  
 Aristotelian 
Philosophy 





The whole is greater 
than the sum of parts 







Relationalism (necessity to 
contingency) 
Focus of the 
Observer 
Prescription (What are 
accurate holistic 
DRIFT results?) 
Description (How can one observe 
and describe adequately the 
decision‐making processes of 
DRIFT) 
To illuminate the analytical power of a system‐environment reformulation of an 
integrated holistic DRIFT, this paper proposes a Luhmannian inspired relational 
framework comprised of variation, selection and retention (Luhmann, 2012). What is 
innovative here is how the framework rectifies the original intentions of holism not by 
merging disciplines or disparate elements, but by releasing the possibilities of self‐
observing a DRIFT, by freeing the analysis from the conventional limits of disciplines 
such as science, economics, politics or law. Admittedly, this does not mean the 
proposed relational framework is more privileged relative to Aristotelian inspired 
DRIFT approaches, but what is acknowledged, is that the framework rest on a different 
kind of blind spot. This being namely the conceptual stance to focus analysis on the 
level of the MRC's organisational chain of decision‐making processes (of one decision 
generating endless DRIFT decision‐making), as opposed to second‐guessing the 
‘minds’ of individual scientists or politicians participating in DRIFT. Hence, the blind 
spot here resides as the analysis observes from within the MRC's DRIFT decision‐
making machinery, a bit like the Walt Disney 3D animation ‘Inside Out’: the analysis 
gazes out onto individuals who, from this observational level, are perceived as alien 
bodies along with everything else (including natural features such as rivers). This may 
not sound very nice. But what this indifference towards individuals and natural features 
does do is paradoxically take them more seriously: it acknowledges that these alien 
bodies remain excluded from society and hence are marginalised, and that the only 
way they can become relevant is if they are incorporated into social communication. 
Indeed, to the research problem of how to come terms with the MRC's necessary to 
holistically proceed/impossible to achieve DRIFT paradox, this is best captured by 
employing a relational framework which precisely captures the complexities of social 
communication, as shown below:  
 
Variation captures the repertoire of possibilities afforded by social systems, 
when the selection is made by the MRC to implement DRIFT scenario planning 
and retain legitimacy in decision‐making. 
Selection captures how the MRC's DRIFT (in)decision processes routinely 
emerges from the conflicting requirements of different social systems. 
Retention captures the MRC's ability to register and process the variable 
conditions which may interrupt the link between variation and selection, 
between DRIFT forecastability and organisational rationality. 
Admittedly, this does not mean the relational framework will automatically win 
that race to improve the conceptualisation of the MRC's DRIFT. After all, the world will 
always be more complex than any given conceptual system. Nonetheless, what the 
relational framework can do is enable one to catch up, at least for a little while – and 
this is useful for helping us understand how the MRC's DRIFT may find a way into the 
‘futurity’ of society, to get to grips with the range of possible meanings attached to 
DRIFT results by a multiplicity of highly differentiated observing systems.  
 
 
4 Improving the conceptualisation of holism  
4.1 Variation 
Variation captures the MRC's accommodation of possible DRIFT results. It represents 
the surprise factor and the potential production of system intelligence. Variation, 
however, is never completely open. What can be detected and processed as possible 
DRIFT results at any time, depends upon the MRC's stream of accompanying 
redundancies, which in this context, is the selection by the MRC to implement 
hydropower scenario planning and retain legitimacy in decision‐making. But how then 
does hydropower planning limit the possible structural variation of an MRC's DRIFT 
results? 
Consider the manner in which hydropower infrastructure ‘technicalises’ the 
MRC's DRIFT through the medium of the code work/fails, and its derivatives such as 
controllable water flows/uncontrollable water flows. What one finds is that the risk of a 
sudden uncontrolled water release will not directly change the MRC's DRIFT results, 
but rather the organisation will change itself, as afforded by, elicited from or ascribed 
by the dynamics of social systems. On the one hand, this is because each social 
system produces an intense sensibility to specific questions, (i.e. an attribution rule 
which falls within its specialised focus). For example, the science system reconstructs 
the risk of a sudden uncontrolled water release according to the severity of ecological 
damage calculated from hydrological models based on the watershed, aquifer, or river 
(sub)basin. The economic system reconstructs the risk according to the ‘least‐cost 
expansion planning’ (Lahmeyer International, 2004) of whether financial systems can 
endure the possibility of a stock market crash which could render investments in the 
infrastructure development worthless. The political system reconstructs the risk 
according to whether the deployment of state authorities such as the police, or where 
necessary, the military are able to maintain and restore public order. And the legal 
system reconstructs the risk according to whether the employed institutional 
framework is adequate to deal with legal liability issues, such as monetary 
compensation for the loss of human life, ecological habitat, or investment property.  
On the other hand, these differentiated criteria of success and relevance arise 
also because each social system simultaneously develops a great indifference 
towards everything else, including the operational logics of other systems. For 
example, in order for science to remain distinct from its environment and thus continue 
its quest for greater understanding of the relationship between hydrological and 
ecological systems (Richey et al., 2000),1 it must develop indifference towards other 
operational logics, such as the monetary benefits gained from DRIFT results 
appeasing the interest of developers. Similarly, when investment risk assessments of 
a hydropower dam are devised, it is reasonable to suppose that the financial system 
will remain indifferent towards all those values that do not translate into the language 
of prices, such as the informal economy of ‘untaxable’ fisheries which do not contribute 
directly to government income (Barlow, 2016). Likewise, when the risk of ecological 
damage to wild‐capture fisheries is calculated, the political system cannot always rely 
on scientific truths to help out, because these truths must also be supportable 
politically, and in line with the policy agenda of prioritising electricity generation to 
power development. Lastly, when one claims that the 1995 Mekong Agreement is 
ecologically unethical, this cannot be assumed to be unlawful, for the legal system 
must remain limited to the rules of the treaty instruments which set them up, whereby 
it is the conduct of state practice, not actual factual harm, which the law can 
understand and consider as lawful or unlawful (Kang, 2018a, 2019).  
If it is true then that in modern society social systems are becoming more 
independent from each other, and thus increasingly able to follow their own logic, then 
this description helps to explain how variation is offered to the MRC's DRIFT. It 
explains how the selective indifference of social systems ‐ the internal construction of 
 
1 For example, between how hydrological flooding affects riparian fishing productivity. 
simpler model worlds ‐ enables an unburdening of each social system from the need 
to have to reconstruct the world in each aspect. It explains why this prior reduction of 
complexity produces in turn a new found internal complexity within each social system, 
making possible the great achievements of science, economics, politics, and the law. 
And it explains why this increased internal complexity, clears the way for a hand in 
hand overall increase in the number of variant DRIFT possibilities, as each social 
system enables the other by introducing their own functional specialisation into each 
other (Djanibekov, Van Assche, & Valentinov, 2016). For example, the politically 
acceptable threshold level of a hydropower dam water release for irrigation purposes 
in the Lower Mekong region, will reappear as a factor that reduces or increases profits 
in the economic world of energy supply distribution, while the language of profit derived 
from income revenue of this energy supply, will reappear in the world of politicians as 
a limitation on how far promises can be made to guarantee a river's right to ‘natural’ 
flow (Kang, 2019). Similarly, the ‘cumulative impact assessment’ (Keskinen & Kummu, 
2010) of the scientist will reappear as a factor that increases or reduces the standard 
protection level of the law, while the legal framework, such as the Dutch Delta Act plan 
reappears in the world of the Mekong scientist as the policy code for land use risk‐
management. In short, due to this process whereby social systems feed into each 
other and adjust to each other in order to maintain their ‘andness’ (i.e. ‘holistic outlook’), 
this above all explains how DRIFT results acquire meaning and significance within 
society. But what mechanisms are available to ensure that such variation of 
constraints remains visible, despite the innate tendency for alternatives to disappear 
into the unseen (i.e. the principle of selective indifference)? The answer can be found 
in the systemisation of selections set in motion by the decision‐making processes of 
the MRC, as will be explored next.  
 
4.2 Selection 
Selection captures how the MRC's DRIFT (in)decision processes routinely emerges 
from the conflicting requirements of different social systems. This does not mean 
social systems themselves determine DRIFT results, but what they do enable is a 
framework that offers the MRC a selection of constraints as designated by the principle 
of variation. For example, when implementing DRIFT scenario planning along the 
transboundary Mekong River, the MRC will usually have to link up to at least four social 
systems. It must be able to communicate economically (e.g. the monetary gains or 
losses of any goods that a river provides), politically (e.g. interpreting what might be 
politically opportune in the future), scientifically (e.g. calculating the severity rating of 
minimal in‐stream river flow) and legally (e.g. ensuring that DRIFT procedures do not 
breach international law). In practice, this means that it is no longer possible to 
perceive the MRC's DRIFT results as a singular unit. Instead, all perfection of unity 
must be abandoned because the DRIFT itself becomes differentiated into a realm of 
sub‐ and alternative systems. Every link to a social system will re‐establish the 
boundaries between what the MRC's DRIFT selects as its redundancies (results), and 
what it excludes and observes as all other systemic communications. And every 
increase in systemic variation will steer the MRC's DRIFT towards the direction that it 
comes to represent flexibility and randomness.  
This description of a ‘heterophonic’ (Andersen, 2003a) decision‐making 
process permanently oscillating between a range of rationalities and languages, offers 
both innovative ontological and epistemological insights. On the one hand, 
ontologically, these functional insights provide the MRC a powerful conceptual grid to 
diagnose for whom the results of DRIFT are articulated as relevant or irrelevant for. 
The operators of the Yali Falls dam in Vietnam, for instance, might present its DRIFT 
benchmark as focused on assessing the dam's environmental impact. It might claim 
that the DRIFT's primary concern is to employ the logics of science and its formulas 
of risk minimisation. But in practice, empirical observation might diagnose that the 
DRIFT undermines the science system by evolving in such a way that the DRIFT 
results revolve around the economic interests of site suitability and electricity 
generation potential. As exemplified when the operators of the Yali Falls dam adopted 
a narrow definition of the project impact area, namely the national borders which may 
be acceptable from a political perspective, but are rejected as an absolute failure in 
terms of scientific basin wide planning, which includes taking into account of the 
transboundary impacts to neighbouring Cambodia (Wyatt & Baird, 2007).  
On the other hand, epistemologically, these conceptual insights also highlight 
how the MRC's DRIFT is essentially grounded in a decision‐making paradox of 
undecidability. In contrast to an ordinary communication which only communicates a 
specific DRIFT result (e.g. the impact on fish migration from the Don Sahong dam in 
Laos is less than significant), the paradox of undecidability communicates also ‐ 
explicitly or implicitly ‐ that there are alternative results that could have been selected 
(e.g. the harmful impact on fish migration from the Thakho dam is less than the Don 
Sahong dam). Indeed, only a DRIFT diagnosis that is in principle undecidable, that is, 
if the rejected alternatives are also communicated can a decision about the results be 
communicated as a decision (Luhmann, 2000). If a DRIFT diagnosis is reached that 
can only be answered in one way (e.g. why is the Don Sahong dam beneficial?), it 
lacks the property of ‘undecidability’ (Andersen, 2003b) and therefore denies the 
MRC's DRIFT the ability to simultaneously potentialise alternatives. These so called 
‘one way’ rational DRIFT results are therefore not rational results at all, and this is why 
one speaks of the loss of trust in the establishment, such as when the Thakho dam 
disappeared as an alternative to the Don Sahong dam (Campbell, Suhardiman, 
Giordano, & McCornick, 2015). By contrast, the co‐ordination of DRIFT would require 
analysis to observe not only what the MRC selects as its DRIFT results, but also the 
manner in which the MRC proceeds to limit its number of alternative DRIFT results. 
More specifically, this being the problem of how might the MRC's DRIFT handle the 
paradox between invisibilising the undecidability of decisions, so as to maintain 
certainty, and visibilising the alternativity of decisions, so as to maintain legitimacy? 
The answer can be found by exploring the manner to which the MRC's DRIFT retains 
itself, as will be explored next.  
 
4.3 Retention 
Retention captures the MRC's ability to register and process the variable conditions 
which may interrupt the link between the decision‐making paradox of selection and 
variation, between organisational rationality and DRIFT forecastability. On the one 
hand, this is because the more the MRC selects its alternative DRIFT results as being 
justified (e.g. the single dam's severity rating is low when cumulative dams are not 
considered), the less the other options will appear as alternative results, and thus the 
less the decision will appear as rationally ‘decided’. On the other hand, the more the 
MRC communicates that there are real alternative DRIFT results to the one that has 
been selected (e.g. when cumulative dams are considered, the severity results are A, 
B or C) the less the selected alternative will appear as justified and thus the less the 
decision will be accepted as ‘decided’.  
Of interest here is the question of how the MRC's DRIFT proceeds to invisibilise 
this paradox in order to retain legitimacy in decision‐making. If one observes how the 
MRC constructs causality so as to justify a course of DRIFT results and subsequent 
recommendations, what one finds is the employment of a typical policy churning 
formula: because of X being identified as wrong as supported by DRIFT results Y, the 
MRC should implement solution Z in order to resolve problem X. Here where X is 
selected it is usually the ‘present future’ (Luhmann, 1976), that is, the present 
observation of potential futures.2As exemplified when the MRC employs a ‘strategic 
environmental assessment’ (Keskinen & Kummu, 2010) and observes that the present 
forecast of Northern Thailand will continue to be a poor and parched inhospitable place, 
and therefore because the Mekong river has ‘significant tolerance’ for development 
(WB and ADB, 2006), more hydropower dams should be built in order to reduce 
poverty and meet increasing energy and irrigation demands.  
Indeed, there is no denying that satisfying future needs must be treated as a 
present problem. After all, under the conditions of the ‘water‐food‐energy’ nexus, 
dealing with these issues today can help mitigate problems in the future. But when 
one considers the future from the perspective of the present, there is always the high 
probability that contradictions will be multiplied. They visibilise namely in the form of 
whose guesses about the future are valid, which is the question of who is in power 
(Kang, 2019). What is to be done then if the proposed solution is politically convenient 
and acceptable to one social system, but leads to a potential functional disturbance in 
other social systems? What if the development of mainstream hydropower dams 
eliminates energy supply scarcity in Lao's, but simultaneously increases fish mortality 
and food insecurity for other local indigenous communities? Due to the successful 
‘invisibilisation of social inequalities’ (Philippopoulos‐Mihalopoulos & Webb, 2015), as 
promised by the political and economic success stories of ‘environmental sustainable 
growth’, such decisions may not produce noise (Kang, 2018b). Yet if this promise is 
broken and the cumulative effects of social exclusion produce disorder and ‘absolute 
uncertainty’, then whatever ways the MRC's DRIFT establishes to manage this crisis, 
it may not achieve more unless it first reckons itself with the vast horizon of temporal 
differences – that is, to extrapolate its present futures with the ‘future presents’ 
(Luhmann, 1976).  
The future present is what the MRC's DRIFT cannot control because it is not 
yet determined. That said, a future present provokes reflection onto a range of things 
that are sayable, thinkable, and knowable within other systems in its environment. It 
looks forward towards the future and from the future observes how the temporal 
patterns of systems both enables and constrains the MRC's DRIFT. For example, 
there are always a range of possible arguments in: financial markets, where the threat 
to scenic or cultural heritage sites are mitigated by money, since there is always the 
possibility that a historical relic, such as the $ 2.5 million auctioning of the Han Dynasty 
Tomb in New York sky‐rocketing (Alberts, Alberts, Bloom, LaFlamme, & Teerikangas, 
2004), within a matter of seconds, the market value of a particular development site; 
political interventions, whereby the themes of river activist ‐ ‘no dam building on the 
Mekong’, ‘no blowing up of the river basin rapids’ ‐ are constructed in a circular 
 
2 From a relational perspective, the reason why an organisational system will tend to prioritise ‘present 
future’ observations, is because when its own selection history comes into play, the system ‘acquires 
an environment in which much is possible but only a little is relevant’ (Luhmann, 1995, 132). 
relationship with the mass media and the political electoral cycles held usually every 
four to five years (Perlaz, 2005); scientific findings, whereby the notion of ‘ameliorating’ 
the migratory impact of dams depends not on producing objective truths about the 
success stories of fish lifts, as these must first be evaluated positively against existing 
scientific publications, and hence by the system which may take decades to verify 
(Sverdup‐Jensen, 2002); or binding legal norms, whereby the validity of damming the 
Xe Kong River for electric generation usually depends on the agreed established rules 
of the Power Purchase Agreement between Laos and Thailand – until something 
unexpected occurs, such as the collapse of the Xe‐Pian Xe‐Namnoy hydropower 
project, and the effect this has of cutting loose the law from its ‘social moorings’ (Kang, 
2019). In short, where the present future seems to lead to mono‐contextual 
descriptions that offer considerable potential for contradiction, the future present leads 
to poly‐contextual descriptions that instead serve to reduce the severity of the 
necessary‐impossible DRIFT paradox. This is because, above all, the future present 
motivates goal‐directed planning, namely, it offers the MRC's DRIFT an arrangement 
of differentiated temporal horizons with which to observe problems and changes more 
specifically, and thus increase the ‘recognition of possibilities that hitherto have 
remained unrecognized’ (King & Thornhill, 2003).  
Of course, visibilising the alternativity of DRIFT results will inevitably increase 
the likelihood that selected results will become even less clear cut. They may even 
visibilise the ‘emergency imaginaries’ (Opitz & Tellmann, 2015) of the ‘co‐evolution of 
unsustainability’ (Kang, 2018b) and subsequently perturbate ‘degrowth’ policies 
(Plaza‐Úbeda, Pérez‐Valls, Céspedes‐Lorente, & Payán‐Sánchez, 2019). Yet this 
permanent oscillation between present futures and future presents, the invisibility and 
visibility of alternative results, or selection and variation, is in fact necessary for the 
MRC's DRIFT retention. It enables the MRC to maintain the impression that a holistic 
DRIFT has been fulfilled and therefore ‘business as usual’ is legitimate. It creates a 
higher degree of freedom for the MRC's DRIFT, since differentiated functional time 
frames also work as a constraint on the MRC's selections, thus consolidating the 
expectations of DRIFT. Finally, above all, it obliges the MRC to learn to take into 
account how its DRIFT results affect other systems in its environment, and how this 
might feed back onto the MRC's decision‐making process itself. Although the 
undecidability paradox will remain irresolvable because of the very disorganisation of 
the MRC's social environment, this does not imply that one has to lose heart and 
surrender to an ‘anything goes’ (Luhmann, 2000). The question is only how might the 
MRC's DRIFT results develop cognitive strategies which can endure the irreducible 
complexity of the world and the selective indifference peculiar to all social systems, 
and to allow these operations to become productive? The answer, nevertheless, can 
only be answered by systems because with different social systems there comes 
different temporal time frames which reconstruct the reality of the world (and hence 
reduce complexity) in functionally differentiated ways.  
 
5 Reflecting on the problem of holism 
This paper investigates the necessary‐impossible paradox facing MRC hydropower 
decision‐makers: that aspiring towards a holistic DRIFT is both socially useful and 
necessary, but also meaningless and impossible (because the future remains 
unknown). To illustrate the nuances of hydropower decision‐making, the paper 
contends that the necessary/impossible DRIFT paradox is best dealt with by 
employing a relational system‐environment model, as opposed to an essentialist 
Aristotelian parts‐whole model. This is because where the latter typically employs 
rational reasoning to show why DRIFT results are holistic, the former takes into 
account that holistic DRIFT results are contingent on the observer, on an 
organisation's position within a network of social systems. Hence, a relational 
approach differs because it acknowledges that DRIFT results are neither necessary, 
nor impossible, but are contingent depending on how social systems are able to 
temporalise their own modes of observation. In practice, this means only if diagnosis 
first captures how and why each social system (law, economy, politics, science, etc) 
employs a specialist criterion of success and relevance, is it possible to work out how 
these systems interact, hang together, contradict or reinforce each other to form the 
results of DRIFT. Indeed, this is what the three‐step relational framework of variation, 
selection and retention aims to recapture.  
 
Variation captures the repertoire of possibilities afforded by social systems, 
when the selection is made by the MRC to implement DRIFT scenario planning 
and retain legitimacy in decision‐making. 
Selection captures how the MRC's DRIFT (in)decision processes routinely 
emerges from the conflicting requirements of different social systems. 
Retention captures the MRC's ability to register and process the variable 
conditions which may interrupt the link between the decision‐making paradox 
of selection and variation, between present futures (which takes DRIFT results 
as given), and future presents (which facilitates a poly‐contextual worldview of 
DRIFT results). 
The contribution here of this relational framework is that by raising the level of 
abstraction, this enables the analysis to point to the complexity of modern society, and 
thus provide an innovative set of paradigms for disciplining the criticism of ‘holism’ in 
DRIFT decision‐making. Of course, this disciplining is not to deny the claims of 
sceptics which scrutinise the impossibility of holism, nor is it to suggest that proponents 
which advocate the necessity of holistic ‘integrative approaches’ are futile aspirations 
which should be given up. But what the framework does do is transcend the two camps, 
by reformulating the problem of holism not as a question of whether the MRC's DRIFT 
offers more rational capacities for problem‐solving, but as the problem of how to 
develop a potential for tolerating the otherwise intolerable – that the crucial 
performance of organisational decision‐making is less the fixation of holistic 
aspirations, and more the responsivity of utilising the vast horizon of temporal 
differences for coping with complexity.  
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